

Is McCain a Maverick? And What is a Maverick, Anyway?

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Abstract: Developments in the 2008 U.S. Presidential campaign have called into question whether John McCain's status as a maverick senator is deserved or not, given his voting record while in the Senate. Two related questions arise -- what *is* a maverick, and how can we tell if a senator is one or not? In this research report, we define a maverick as someone who votes with their party less than expected, given their ideology. We then use this definition to assess John McCain's maverick credentials across his career in the Senate, and with respect to his fellow senators (current and historical.) We generally conclude that McCain has earned his reputation as a maverick, and discuss the relevance of this conclusion by considering the characteristics of senators with whom he shares the distinction.

Although the idea had been a fixture of American politics for some time, references to John McCain's perceived status as a "maverick" politician have seemingly become more numerous over the course of the 2008 presidential campaign. The McCain campaign has aggressively promoted this perception, hoping to build the appealing connotations of independence that come along with the label – a task that becomes especially important in an electoral environment that is generally hostile to the Republican brand name. Even the Obama campaign has put McCain's maverick image to use for its own purposes – characterizing McCain as "erratic"² could be seen as a tactic of inversion aimed at undermining McCain's strengths in the eyes of voters.

In addition, the current campaign has caused many to question whether McCain has kept his maverick status intact to the present day. To be sure, McCain's successful bid for the Republican nomination caused him to tack to the right on many issues that once distinguished him from the GOP line – perhaps most striking (and most politically necessary) was his change

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² Patrick Healy. "Obama Calls McCain Mortgage Plan 'Risky'" *New York Times*. October 9, 2008

of position on President Bush's income tax policies³. Moreover, in their zeal to associate McCain with Bush and the Republican brand name, the Obama campaign has highlighted how often McCain voted with Bush while in the Senate⁴. Such a line of attack implicitly calls into question whether McCain ever deserved the moniker of "maverick" in the first place – even the descendants of the man responsible for the origination of the term have taken up this line of argument, saying that McCain's voting record renders him undeserving of the appellation⁵.

The Conventional Case for McCain's Maverick Status

So, how can we tell whether McCain is a maverick or not? A good place to start would be with a definition. The *Oxford English Dictionary* gives, as its second definition for the word "maverick," the following: "an unorthodox or independent-minded person; a person who refuses to conform to the views of a particular group or party; an individualist."⁶ This definition seems to capture what is meant by using the term to describe McCain – he has an "independent streak" that puts him at odds with his party on numerous issues.

To support this *prima facie* case for McCain's maverick status, Figure 1 displays McCain's party unity score, or the rate with which he supported the majority position of his party on roll-call votes which pitted a majority of Republicans against a majority of Democrats, for each Congress McCain has spent in the Senate⁷. The results conform to the conventional wisdom about McCain's reputation as a maverick, especially when situated over time. Specifically, McCain's party unity scores start to sink below the average of his Republican colleagues in the

³ Elisabeth Bumiller. "How Close McCain is to Bush Depends on the Issue." *New York Times*. June 17, 2008.

⁴ William Douglas and Margaret Talev. "Back on Campaign Trail, McCain Drops Ayers in Favor of 'Joe'" *Miami Herald*. October 16, 2008. (Accessed online, Oct. 20, 2008.)

⁵ John Schwarz, "Who You Callin' a Maverick?" *New York Times*. October 4, 2008.

⁶ Retrieved from <http://dictionary.oed.com/> in October 2008, with search term "maverick."

⁷ The party unity data used here were introduced by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, and are available at Keith Poole's website: <http://www.voteview.com/>

105th (1997-1998) and 106th (1999-2000) Congresses, as he prepares for, and engages in, his first run for the Republican presidential nomination. The gap between McCain's scores and the Republican average is biggest in the 107th Congress (2001-2002.) This is unsurprising, given that this was the Congress in which two of McCain's most prominent pieces of signature legislation were passed -- the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. In the last two completed Congresses, McCain's behavior moves a little in the direction of average Republican party support, but still remains markedly low.

Looking at McCain's relative ranking in terms of party unity, especially in recent Congresses, is also instructive. As Table 1 shows, with his party support record, McCain finds himself in the company of many Republican moderates. In fact, the rankings in this table suggest that one could be at odds with one's party without having this sort of independent streak -- moderate legislators find themselves in such situations all the time, without (necessarily) being hailed as mavericks for their trouble.

Mavericks and Moderates: the Importance of Expectations

Thinking this way about moderates and mavericks this way allows us to sharpen our intuition about what makes a legislator a "maverick" (as opposed to a moderate.) Specifically, moderate defections from the party are expected, whereas maverick defections are unexpected. Put another way, we expect moderates to vote against their party more often than non-moderates in the first place, so when we see moderates vote against their party, we aren't surprised. A maverick, then, can be defined as *someone who surprises us by voting against their party as often as they do, given their ideology*⁸. To determine whether a senator is a maverick (and how much of a

⁸ This focus on *party unity* distinguishes our definition (and our resulting measure) for "maverick" from that found in earlier work, which focuses on the likelihood of *errors* in spatial voting patterns predicted from ideological

maverick they are,) all we need to do is figure out how often we expect that senator to support their party, and then see how often they actually do support their party. The difference between the expectation and the reality can be called a “maverick measure.”

A simple example can illustrate this distinction in practice. Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical legislature with nine members, arranged according to their ideologies – members on the left are more liberal and members on the right are more conservative. Party allegiances line up with these ideologies – the four leftmost members are Democrats, and the five to the right are Republicans. These legislators are faced with roll-call votes on three pieces of legislation. On the first vote, the legislators split along party lines, but also on ideological lines – the liberal Democrats vote no, and the conservative Republicans vote yes. On the second vote, the outcome is slightly different – one Republican defects to join the Democrats in voting no, so the vote is not determined purely along party lines. However, the vote still occurs along ideological lines, since it is the most moderate legislator that comes along with the Democrats. In the long run, we would likely expect moderates to cross party lines more often than non-moderates, owing to the fact that, on any given issue, they are more likely to have convictions that are close to the ideologies of members of the opposing party,

The third vote is like the second in that one Republican comes along with the Democrats, but this time, it is a non-moderate Republican that crosses party lines. Therefore, this vote defies *ideological* expectations, as well as *partisan* expectations. While patterns displayed on both the second and third votes are surprising, the third vote is more surprising, as we’d expect legislator 8 to be less likely to vote with the Democrats than legislator 5. Legislator 5 is a “moderate,” and legislator 8 is a “maverick” – the former defects in a way that we expect, whereas the latter

scaling procedures; see Benjamin Lauderdale, “Proxmire and the Golden Fleece: Searching for Maverick Legislators in Spatial Voting Errors ” Paper presented at the 65th MPSA Annual National Conference, Chicago, IL April 12-15, 2007.

defects in a way that is more unexpected, given their respective ideologies. Over a series of votes, one can think of ideology as determining an expected *rate* of voting with one's party, then – those who stray from this expected relationship in a systematic way are the people we think of as “mavericks.”⁹ Using data on senators' party unity rate (mentioned above) and ideology created by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal¹⁰, we can produce a “Maverick measure” that captures which members vote with their parties less than we would expect given their position on a liberal-conservative ideological scale¹¹. Using this measure, we can determine whether or not John McCain is a maverick, and if he is one, how much of a maverick he is, relative to other Senate mavericks throughout history.

Results

Having defined how to assess a Senator's maverick credentials, we now turn to a summary of the scores over time. Figure 3 illustrates the standard deviation of the Maverick measure within each party, starting from the end of Reconstruction (1877) and ending with the most recent completed Congress (2006.) As the figure shows, the dispersion of Maverick scores fluctuates greatly over time, with some historical eras being more fertile ground for mavericks than others. Additionally,

⁹ It should be noted that moderates can be mavericks, too, provided that vote with their party *even less than we would already expect*, given their centrist positions.

¹⁰ Their measures of ideology (here we use DW-NOMINATE dimension 1 scores) use multidimensional scaling to recover the underlying structure of ideological conflict in roll-calls, within a given Congress. Their scaling procedure is discussed in Poole and Rosenthal, *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. All of their data are available at Keith Poole's website (<http://www.voteview.com/>).

¹¹ A more technical definition of the “Maverick score” for each legislator's roll-call record for a Congress is the difference between a member's observed party unity in a given Congress and their expected party unity in that Congress, obtained from calculating expectations from a Tobit model regressing party unity on an adjusted form of DW-NOMINATE scores from that Congress, and the adjusted scores squared (in the parlance of such models, the “expected value” in question here is the expected “y-star”) for all members of that party in that Congress. The adjustment made was to give all entries a Congress-specific and party-specific constant shift, to ensure that the member of that party closest to the opposing party had an ideology score of 0.000 – this was done to facilitate the inclusion of the squared term in the model. The final data, and additional technical details, are available upon request from the authors.

while the variation within one party tends to move in the same direction as the variation within the other party, intraparty differences are noticeable for numerous Congresses. Assuming these macro-level trends across time and party are caused by factors outside of the direct control of the Senators themselves, then this variation implies the necessity of accounting for the variation in Maverick scores by Congress and by party. For this reason, we standardize¹² the Maverick measure to account for the dispersion of the raw measure within each party for each Congress. The result is a measure that allows us to compare the maverick status of Senators across Congresses, albeit by modifying the definition of maverick to make its meaning relative to each particular Congress.

McCain's Maverick scores for each Congress spent in the Senate are reported in Table 2, as are the rankings assigned to those scores (within the Republican party, and within the entire chamber.) His scores (and rankings) fluctuate up and down while Republicans were in the minority, taking a final jump up in the first period of Republican control (the 104th.) Starting with the 105th, though, McCain establishes a record on party unity votes that consistently rates him as one of the Senate's top mavericks. As in our earlier, naïve analysis, McCain's maverick credentials reach their peak in the 107th Congress, but McCain places in the top 5 among Republicans in each of the last five completed Congresses, and tops the Republican rankings in each of the last three. His rankings within the chamber at large are similarly lofty – he places first in the 107th and 108th, and in the top 10 three more times in the past five Congresses. In short, while McCain was not much of a maverick when the Republicans were in the minority, in the five Congresses under (mainly) Republican control, McCain established consistently high Maverick scores.

¹² Technically, the most appropriate term is “studentize,” since the process used is equivalent to the process used to produce studentized residuals from an OLS regression.

The discussion so far has established that McCain is more of a maverick now than he was earlier in his career, and that his latter-day maverick credentials compare favorably to those of his Senate contemporaries. However, the standardized Maverick scores also allow us to compare all senators since before Reconstruction – how does McCain rate within this historical sample? To answer this, career average standardized Maverick scores (e.g. a simple average of all single Congress standardized Maverick scores for a given senator) were calculated for each senator that served more than a single term (e.g. each senator with more than 3 single-Congress scores) since Reconstruction. Of the 1152 senators in our post-Reconstruction data set, 594 meet this condition – in that group, John McCain ranks seventh. Interestingly, his is not the highest score among Senators from recent Congresses – Lincoln Chafee (R-RI,) a “moderate” serving from his father’s death in 1999 until his failed re-election bid in 2006, comes in at third place on this measure¹³.

A list of the top 25 maverick Senators (again, among those with more than 3 scores) since Reconstruction can be found at the bottom of this report, along with a brief sketch of the less familiar names in the top 10 included for historical context. Politically, these mavericks are products of a diverse set of factors – constituency-driven policy concerns, foreign policy heterodoxies and individual idiosyncrasies abound. Personally, too, the mavericks are generally an eccentric and irascible bunch. Some of these individual traits are innocuous, such as William Proxmire’s enthusiastic promotion of individual fitness and healthy living¹⁴. Other are not so innocuous – for instance, in 1934, “Wild Bill” Langer of North Dakota was removed from the Governor’s office by the state supreme court after having been convicted of fraud. He responded

¹³ This finding suggests that perhaps the measure does not do enough to eliminate moderates from consideration as potential mavericks. Alternatively, it could also suggest that at least some of Chafee’s reputation as a moderate was erroneously attributed, and that he was more of a maverick than the conventional wisdom implied.

¹⁴ See William Proxmire. *You Can Do It! Senator Proxmire’s Exercise, Diet and Relaxation Plan*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973 and _____. *Your Joy Ride to Health*. Washington: Proxmire Publishing, 1993.

to the ruling by barricading himself in the governor's mansion and declaring North Dakota to be an independent country¹⁵ (he subsequently went to jail, was eventually acquitted of the charges, and went on to win statewide races for Governor and for Senate.) Together, these profiles suggest that while mavericks often display great political courage, the charges of the “erratic” nature of maverick politics may not be too far off from reality.

Conclusions and Caveats

In conclusion, our analysis suggests that, in the latter half of his career, John McCain developed empirically identifiable credentials as a “maverick” in the Senate. Moreover, in using the standardized scores to compare mavericks over time, John McCain's credentials remain strong. A few caveats to the analysis should be added, though. First, the process of standardizing Maverick scores with respect to score dispersion within Congresses is debatable on a substantive level – if we insist on an absolute standard in determining who is and who is not a maverick, then it is possible to contend that there are no “true” mavericks in the present day. Effectively, our standardized measure determines who are “outliers” in their maverick status, relative to the distribution of their co-partisan contemporaries – McCain could then be seen as a somewhat independently-minded legislator in a time with very few such legislators.

Additionally, it's not clear whether DW-NOMINATE scores used to represent ideology capture all of the relevant ideological structure needed to characterize “expected levels of party unity¹⁶. Finally, the existing data set fails to take into account roll-call votes from the most

¹⁵ John Holzworth. *The Fighting Governor: The Story of William Langer and the State of North Dakota*. Chicago: Pointer Press, 1938.

¹⁶ In fact, McCain is notable for being having a very high score on DW-NOMINATE's second dimension. While Poole and Rosenthal (2000) identify second dimension scores with historic “party-splitting issues” involving sectional factions within parties, the substantive meaning of this dimension in the present age is not clear. The authors are presently investigating the impact of second-dimension scores on observed patterns of party unity, as well as the substantive meaning of said scores.

recent Congress, as the 110th Congress has yet to complete its work. Still, even with these caveats in mind, we believe that the data present strong evidence that McCain’s reputation as a maverick is well-deserved.

Top 10 Career Average Maverick Scores (Standardized), 1877-2006

1. William Langer (R-ND,) 1941-57 3.551

Nicknamed “Wild Bill,” Langer was labeled “the Senate’s most baffling man” by the *Saturday Evening Post*¹⁷. Reflecting North Dakota’s agrarian politics (as well as the influence of the Russian-German heritage of many in his home state,) Langer was a staunch isolationist¹⁸ – after World War II this conviction brought him into conflict with the bipartisan internationalist consensus. An early opponent of the developing Cold War, Langer accused the Truman administration of exaggerating the Soviet threat¹⁹, and crossed the Eisenhower administration so often as to spark rumors of an imminent defection to the Democratic Party (which never materialized)²⁰.

2. Preston Plumb (R-KS,) 1877-91 2.693

An Ohio native, Plumb relocated in Kansas in the 1850s, to lend his support to anti-slavery causes. During the Civil War, he enlisted in the Union Army, and helped defend Kansas against raiding Confederate irregulars²¹. His anti-slavery bona fides led a biographer to declare that "Plumb was one of those who had made it possible to form the Republican party and was strongly grounded in the necessity of fealty to its principles," while simultaneously acknowledging that “. . . his sympathies were always so much with the people that he never was an uncompromising party man."²² His commitment to side with his agrarian constituency manifested itself in his support for free silver²³ and for protective tariffs for agriculture²⁴.

3. Lincoln Chafee (R-RI,) 1999-2006 2.114

4. Frank Lausche (D-OH,) 1957-69 1.731

A fiscally conservative Democrat, Lausche clashed frequently with both the national forces of organized labor, and the particular interests of local party officials. The New York Times noted

¹⁷ Beverly Smith. “The Senate’s Most Baffling Man.” *Saturday Evening Post*. July 23, 1954.

¹⁸ Lawrence Larsen. "William Langer: A Maverick in the Senate." *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 44 (Spring 1961): 189-98.

¹⁹ Robert Wilkins. "Senator William Langer and National Priorities: An Agrarian Radical's View of American Foreign Policy, 1945-1952." *North Dakota Quarterly* 42 (Autumn 1974): 42-59

²⁰ "Senator Langer, 73, G.O.P Rebel, Dead." *New York Times*. November 9, 1959.

²¹ William Elsey Connelly. *The Life of Preston B. Plumb, 1837-1891*. Chicago: Browne & Howell Co., 1913

²² Connelly, p. 345

²³ Connelly, p. 347

²⁴ Connelly, p. 367

the disparity between his nominal support for the Democrats and his numerous policy clashes with them: “A surprise backer of John F. Kennedy, Mr. Lausche then opposed many policies of the Democratic administration.”²⁵

5. George Edmunds (R-VT,) 1866-91 1.695

Principally remembered as one of the architects of the political compromise that settled the Presidential election of 1876 (putting Rutherford Hayes in the White House and ending Reconstruction),²⁶ Edmunds was closely identified with the “Half-Breed” faction of the Republican party. Clashing with Republican machine politicians in the cause of civil service reform, Edmunds was otherwise a political conservative. His exemplification of the Half Breed movement qualified this label, though, as Half-Breeds favored a rapprochement in the conflicts between labor and capital that were beginning to surface in that era²⁷.

6. Edward Oliver Wolcott (R-CO,) 1889-1901 1.620

Hailing from a silver-producing state, Wolcott faithfully represented the bimetallic preferences of his constituents from within the Republican Party²⁸. Holding off an increasingly influential Populist challenge in Colorado, Wolcott repeatedly reassured supporters that, “. . . if the time ever came when he should have to decide between his party and silver he would cast his fortunes with the white metal.”²⁹ With the repudiation of bimetallism by the Republican McKinley administration, Wolcott’s voice in the party became increasingly lonely.

7. John McCain (R-AZ,) 1987-present 1.566

8. William Henry King (D-UT,) 1917-41 1.444

A self-identified Jeffersonian Democrat, King was an advocate of states’ rights and decentralization of government power. While he expressed support for the New Deal during the early years of FDR’s presidency, he later became one of its most vocal opponents³⁰. King also distinguished himself by his opposition to U.S. imperialism in Latin America (especially in Haiti) – a position that came from both a moral commitment to the concept of national self-determination and pragmatic concerns over fiscal discipline³¹.

²⁵ Wolfgang Saxon. "Frank Lausche, Ex-Ohio Senator and Governor for Five Terms, 94." *New York Times*. April 22, 1990.

²⁶ Norbert Kuntz. "Edmunds' Contrivance: Senator George Edmunds of Vermont and the Electoral Compromise of 1877." *Vermont History* 38 (Autumn 1970): 305-15

²⁷ Richard Welch. "George Edmunds of Vermont: Republican Half-Breed." *Vermont History* 36 (Spring 1968): 64-73

²⁸ Thomas Fulton Dawson. *Life and Character of Edward Oliver Wolcott*. Vol. 1. New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1911.

²⁹ Dawson, p. 234

³⁰ "William King Dies; Senator 24 Years" *New York Times*. November 28, 1949.

³¹ Laurence Hauptman. "Utah Anti-Imperialist: Senator William H. King and Haiti, 1921-34." *Utah Historical Quarterly* 41 (Spring 1973): 116-27

9. William Proxmire (D-WI,) 1957-89

1.437

A somewhat eccentric person, Proxmire has been described as “a loner, frequently at odds not just with Republicans but also with members of his own party.”³² In addition to his opposition to the Vietnam War, Proxmire was distinguished by his commitment to elimination of unnecessary government spending, handing out “Golden Fleece” awards denoting extravagant or frivolous government expenditures, and writing books cataloging instances of government waste and inefficiency³³.

10. Robert Bailey Howell (R-NE,) 1923-33

1.420

A prairie populist, Howell’s signature issues included a commitment to Prohibitionism and an isolationist foreign policy.³⁴ A half-hearted supporter of Republican presidential candidates, Howell went on to engage in high-profile public clashes with the Coolidge administration over agreement to settle European debts from the First World War³⁵. While in the Senate, Howell exhibited a “chronic disregard of party position,”³⁶ amassing “. . . nearly an impeccable progressive voting record from 1923 to 1933.”³⁷

[Rounding Out the Top 25:

11. Paul Douglas (D-IL,) 1949-67; 12. Joseph Brown (D-GA,) 1880-91; 13. Carter Glass (D-VA,) 1920-46; 14. George Malone (R-NV,) 1947-59; 15. Frank Gooding (R-ID,) 1921-28; 16. Gordon Humphrey (R-NH,) 1979-90; 17. Kent Conrad (D-ND,) 1987-present; 18. Peter Norbeck (R-SD,) 1921-36; 19. Millard Tydings (D-MD,) 1927-51; 20. Charles Spalding Thomas (D-CO,) 1913-21; 21. Peter Gerry (D-RI,) 1917-29, 1935-47; 22. Josiah William Bailey (D-NC,) 1931-46; 23. Judd Gregg (R-NH,) 1993-present; 24. J. William Fulbright (D-AR,) 1945-75
25. James Brady (R-ID,) 1911-18;]

³² Richard Severo. "William Proxmire, Maverick Democratic Senator From Wisconsin, is Dead at 90." *New York Times*. December 16, 2005.

³³ See William Proxmire. *Uncle Sam – The Last of the Bigtime Spenders*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972, and _____, *The Fleecing of America*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980.

³⁴ Patrick O’Brien. "Senator Robert B. Howell: A Midwestern Progressive and Insurgent During 'Normalcy'" *Emporia State Research Studies* 19 (December 1970): 1-28

³⁵ "Senator Howell of Nebraska Dies." *New York Times*. March 12, 1933.

³⁶ O’Brien, p. 11

³⁷ O’Brien, p. 27.

Figure 1
McCain's Party Unity Score and Republican Party Unity Average, 100th- 109th Congresses




Table 1
McCain's Party Unity Score (Poole and Rosenthal) and
Ranking Among Republican Senators, 106th-109th Congresses

<u>106th Congress</u>			<u>107th Congress</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Senator</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Senator</u>	<u>Score</u>
1	Craig (ID)	98.95	1	Helms (NC)	98.36
	
43	Lugar (IN)	87.23	43	Lugar (IL)	78.39
44	Smith, G. (OR)	86.77	44	Smith, G. (OR)	75.94
45	McCain (AZ)	86.77	45	McCain (AZ)	71.2
46	Abraham (MI)	85.83	46	Collins (ME)	63.58
47	Fitzgerald (IL)	85.21	47	Snowe (ME)	61.73
	
56	Chafee, L. (RI)	38.07	50	Chafee (RI)	51.39
	AVERAGE	90.31		AVERAGE	88.2
 <u>108th Congress</u>			 <u>109th Congress</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Senator</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Senator</u>	<u>Score</u>
1	Thomas (WY)	99.52	1	Bunning (KY)	97.9
	
45	Campbell (CO)	90.58	47	Smith, G. (OR)	81.61
46	Dewine (OH)	88.54	48	Voinovich (OH)	81.4
47	McCain (AZ)	84.26	49	McCain (AZ)	80.59
48	Specter (PA)	80.73	50	Coleman (MN)	77.15
49	Collins (ME)	78.04	51	Dewine (OH)	68.12
	
51	Chafee (RI)	69.54	55	Chafee (RI)	44.36
	AVERAGE	94.17		AVERAGE	88.63

Figure 2
 A “Moderate” and a “Maverick” in a Hypothetical Legislature

	(most liberal)				(most conservative)				
Senator	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Party	D	D	D	D	R	R	R	R	R
Vote 1	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vote 2	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vote 3	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y

Moderate
Maverick

Figure 3
Intra-Party Standard Deviations of Maverick Scores,
45th to 109th Congresses (1877-2006)




Table 2
McCain's Maverick Scores (Standardized) and Rankings, 100th – 109th Congresses

Congress	<u>McCain's</u> Score*	<u>Republican</u> Rank#	<u>Overall</u> Rank#
100th (1987-88)	-0.653	36/46	74/103
101st (1989-90)	0.189	19/45	39/100
102nd (1991-92)	0.312	11/44	26/102
103rd (1993-94)	-0.593	35/44	74/101
104th (1995-96)	0.883	10/55	15/103
105th (1997-98)	1.439	4/55	8/100
106th (1999-2000)	1.711	3/56	6/102
107th (2001-02)	4.917	1/50	1/100
108th (2003-04)	4.773	1/51	1/99
109th (2005-06)	2.682	1/55	2/100

* Values are multiplied by -1, so that higher scores are associated with stronger maverick credentials

Denominators are determined by counting all individuals in the data set. The data set includes all Senators who declared a Republican or Democratic affiliation, and participated in a sufficient number of roll-calls to have their ideological position located via the scaling procedure. For these reasons, the chamber total may not add up to 100, and the Republican total may not line up with accounts of the two-party balance at that time.