Net Neutrality and Game Theory
During the last class, a comparison was drawn between some aspects of game theory and certain interactions in a net neutrality-like conflict. I came across an article in Slate.com, The Stag Hunt, in which a game theorist applied the theory of the same name to a British banking collapse. Whereas the prisoner’s dilemma reconciles self interest with mitigation of loss (of freedom), the stag hunt appears to involve cooperation and the trust between self interested parties. The article explains the theory:
“In the stag hunt, two hunters must each decide whether to hunt the stag together or hunt rabbits alone. Half a stag is better than a brace of rabbits, but the stag will only be brought down with a combined effort. Rabbits, on the other hand, can be hunted by an individual without any trouble. There are two rational outcomes to the stag hunt: Either both hunters hunt the stag as a team, or each hunts rabbits by himself. Each would prefer to cooperate in hunting the stag, but if the other player’s motives or actions are uncertain, the rabbit hunt is a risk-free alternative.”
The “prisoner’s dilemma” is demonstrated in Felton’s discussion of network discriminaton. Assesesing network response to congestion he finds that “[o]ne interesting aspect of this system is that it is voluntary - the system relies on endpoint computers to slow down when they see congestion, but nothing forces them to do so.” Rather than pursuing the rational self interested approach to network congestion - keep sending packets out quickly - enough computers reduce their rates sufficient to loosen the jam. Felten also notes the challenges that upsetting this balance would cause:
“If the network disciminates by sending misleading signals about congestion, and sending them preferentally to certain machines or certain applications, the incentive for those machines and applications to stick to the social contract and do ther share to control congestion will weaken.”
But what about the stag hunt and cooperation? Yoo references a certain degree of collaboration in defending a form of network disrcimination - access tiering - but this form of association is not based on trust or inconsistent with immediate self interest.
It would seem possible that a form of stag’s hunt would be possible in response to the network neutrality debate. ISPs and content providers may have an interest in cooperating in a system that brought both greater rewards (more users and revenues), and perhaps reduced risk (from, perhaps, regulation, litigation or competition). However, the only cyber-centric pattern apparent would be the acquisition or consolidation of firms, rather than direct cooperation.
The recently reported iTunes and Starbucks collaborative indicates that there is opportunity for cooperative content delivery projects. It will be interesting to see what cyber-associations arise in the midst of the net neutrality debate.