Eric Lausten's weblog

Last week, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved H.R. 275, the Global Online Protection Act of 2007. Despite the ambitious name, the bill is actually pretty limited in scope.

Introduced by Rep. Chris Smith (NJ-4th) - a strident human rights advocate, the bill opens with the usual legislative justifying platitudes (aka “Findings”): free speech is good, the Internet helps, online censorship is bad, some US companies help nations censor, and they shouldn’t. US policy, it states, shall promote free speech regardless of media, medium or locale, shall use its (non-military) power to achieve that end, and will deter domestic corporate cooperation in said efforts with “officials of Internet-restricting countries”.

OK, sounds good. This leaves one expecting a comprehensive bill addresing the many ways US firms have abetted Internet censorship. Maybe it would regulate services such as filtering or blocking, control the export of servers and routers, restrict training or other support to censorship or user-tracking programs, right?

Nope. Instead, it takes a much more measured, and perhaps incremental, approach. The only statutory control the bill puts in place is a prohibition on maintaining (or “locating”) the electronic collection of “personally identifiable information” in any “designated Internet-restricting nation”. Release of any such information to such nations, with the exception of “legitimate foreign law enforcement purposes as determined by the Department of Justice”. Notably, the bill is devoid of any definition or process for such DOJ determination, and such a hole leaves the provision subject to interpretation, and arguably ineffective. A private cause of action is permitted for the release of personally-identifiable information to any listed nation, a response to Yahoo’s release to the Chinese government of a local jounalist Shi Tao’s information, and his subsequent imprisonment.

Otherwise, US service providers are prohibited from blocking any US government websites, and ISPs and search engine providers must report on the circumstances of their online filtering, blocking and removal actions. Penalties are instituted for businesses or their officers who violate these provisions (which the President is authorized to waive).

An Office of Global Internet Freedom is established within the State Department (why the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor can’t absorb this function, and why a new office is needed, is not apparent). This office supports the annual Presidential designation of the aforementioned “Internet-restricting countries” (though the bills listsan initial 9 nations). Finally, the bill requires a few reports, including the consideration of online free speech in the annual State Department reports on human rights, economic assistance and security assistance, and another on the feasibility of using export controls to control transfers of Internet-censoring items.

The bill doesn’t have quite the teeth one would expect from its bold name. Nonetheless, the meat of the bill may be the information and designations listed above. As this data is collected, a better picture of how US firms support Internet censorship in undemocratic nations is developed. And with this, for good or bad, using this information incrementally may allow Congress may bare its sharp teeth in the future.

Posted by Eric at 10:58 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

Earlier today, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection considered a bill, HR 3461, the Safeguarding America’s Families by Enhancing and Reorganizing New and Efficient Technologies Act of 2007. The bill, as originally drafted, would authorize $10 million annually for the Federal Trade Commission to “to increase public awareness and provide education regarding Internet safety, for families, businesses, organizations, and other users”.

Debate centered on two issues. First, Republicans objected that the bill was redundant since the government already conduct such activities - specifically, the FTC already operates OnGuard, which provides “practical tips from the federal government and the technology industry to help you be on guard against Internet fraud, secure your computer, and protect your personal information.” Second, the level of funding was argued to be too substantial. Though some objections remained, even after the Subcommittee Chairman offered an amendment to cut the funding in half, to $5 million annually, the bill was passed by voice vote.

Certainly, internet safety is important. There is not too much that the government can do to actively protect individuals and their networks from internet threats, such as worms, viruses, scams and phishing. Unlike realspace security, it is unreasonable to expect a cop to stand guard around the most threatened computers or users. While many cybercrimes are at higher, more lucrative levels in the commerce system, many individuals remain at risk. The federal Internet Crime Complaint Center found, in its 2006 annual report, that “from January 1, 2006 – December 31, 2006, the IC3 website received 207,492 complaint submissions”, and though “this is a 10.4% decrease when compared to 2005 when 231,493 complaints were received”, this is still a substanial number. Further, according to the report, 2006 was the first year in which complaints decreased (though the financial impacts increased) - “up from $183.12 million in total reported losses in 2005”. “The total dollar loss from all referred cases of fraud was $198.44 million with a median dollar loss of $724.00 per complaint.”

The report notes that only 1 in 7 cases reported is ever followed up by enforcement or regulatory agencies. Therefore, more awareness would help prevent individual users take measures to increase their own security and safety online, and the legislation is well-intentioned. With prosecution and enforcement of cybercrime challenging and limited, awareness and preparedness are more feasible courses of action, particularly for individuals. Firms, on the other hand, typically have greater resources (relative, of course, to their size), and are better poised to provide their own security.

Posted by Eric at 05:00 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

There was a deluge of relevant news midweek, and I thought I’d quickly share some.

Both CNN and others, including CQ (subscription required), reported on the House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman claims today that Yahoo! “misled Congress regarding information the Internet company gave to Chinese authorities about the journalist Shi Tao”. A hearing will be held next month to determine if, during a February 2006 hearing, executives of the online firm lied to Congress about its cooperation with the Chinese government regarding the online activity of the journalist.

Shi Tao had posted on the Internet under a pseudonym about a crackdown by the government, and was later arrested. Yahoo “gave Chinese authorities information about his e-mail account, his computer address, his log-on history and the contents of several weeks of his e-mail, Lantos said.” Yahoo officials dispute these allegations. They are also being sued by Shi Tao in civil court. It will be interesting to see how this hearing, and case, play out (at least one Republican is noted criticizing Yahoo’s underlying policies that led to the info sharing with Chinese secret police). It is also a curious angle on the course reading, as it now appears that a firm is caught in the middle, having been coopted by one government to control and regulate the Internet, and now running afoul of another government, at least in part, for doing so (Congress certainly is nonplussed about having been lied to, but is intent on examining the underlying Yahoo info sharing policy as well).

Similarly, the Washington Post (“Crackdowns On Bloggers Increasing, Survey Finds”) reports on press freedom and increasing controls over blogging, according to a report from Reporters Without Borders. “”Countries that were not sentencing journalists to prison terms anymore have been doing it these last months for bloggers. This is the case in Egypt and Jordan,” the RPF Director is quoted. North Korea, Eritrea and Turkmenistan make the bottom of the list, while Iceland is tops for press freedom.

Finally, returning to the net neutrality debate conversation from a few weeks ago, the Post also carries an Op Ed written by the otherwise diametrically opposed leaders of NARAL Pro-Choice America and the Christian Coalition of America. The topic: Verizon’s nascent effort to censor NARAL’s text messaging, which it quickly relented on. Not much commentary is needed - the two basically take the telecom firm to task for corporate censorship:

When it comes to censoring free speech, sorry just isn’t good enough. Whatever your political views — conservative or liberal, Republican or Democrat, pro-choice or pro-life — it shouldn’t be up to Verizon to determine whether you receive the information you requested. Why should any company decide what you choose to say or do over your phone, your computer or your BlackBerry? Technologies are converging in our communications system, but the principles of free expression and the rights of all Americans to speak without intervention should remain paramount.

They go on to note that both organizations, and many others, are seeking to increase awareness of tech discrimination and its potential impacts on their advocacy efforts, and call on Congress for hearings on these issues. That may be a welcome return to the net neutrality debate, smartly taken out of the corp v. corp framework, and to now include otherwise focused members of civil society in the equation. I also share their closing, as I found the analogy appropos:

If corporations can’t tell Americans what to say on a phone call, they shouldn’t be able to control content or tell us what to say in a text message, an e-mail or anywhere else.

Posted by Eric at 11:00 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

I ran across an interesting article in Slate.com recently that I thought I’d share. The article was part of a series on law breaking - and no, that is not why I read it (I am perfectly able to break the law without online advice!).

Rather, the article, written by Tim Wu, who we witnessed earlier debating Chris Yoo on network neutrality (Wu opposed online commercial discrminiation; Yoo saw it as “nothing more than network owners’ attempts to satisfy the increasingly intense and heterogeneous demands imposed by end users”) is titled “American Lawbreaking; Tolerated Use: The Copyright Problem”, and I thought it’d be interesting. Wu argues here that, after traffic laws, copyright laws are among the most broken in our nation. And in the online world, the practice has gotten worse. YouTube, file-sharing, burning mix CDs - they are all affronts on the creative development, and ownership, of copyrights. But Wu notes an interesting contrast that has arisen, which opens the door to larger questions on IP and copyright enforcement online.

While some copyright violations have been harshly enforced (such as the mega-fines for illegal filesharing), there is a growing trend of copyright owners to turn a blind eye, if not outrightly encouraging certain violations. Specifically, he notes two cases to support this - Saturday Night Live, and a Guyz Night rock band parody of Die Hard. Here is more about the latter:

The story of Guyz Nite is the perfect illustration of this conflict within media firms. Guyz Nite is a “comic rock” group that made a video for its song Die Hard, composed entirely of clips from the three Die Hard movies, produced by 20th Century Fox. It was posted on YouTube.

Fox’s legal department went first, ordering YouTube to take down the video, pronto. But then Fox’s marketing department effectively reversed its own lawyers by contacting Guyz Nite and offering to pay them to put the video back up. You can’t fault Fox’s reasoning: The band was creating the kind of viral marketing you can’t buy—intellectual property rules be damned. In a reversal of fortune, Fox even invited the band to the New York premiere of the fourth Die Hard film.

So, the larger corporations seem to be valuing the costs and benefits of this type of copyright violation, and determining that the added viewership outweighs the opportunity costs in litigating the infraction. This is not universal, of course, and Wu cites the case of Viacom who is suing YouTube for a cool $1 billion and to force the online entity to “proactively block all Viacom content” (good luck on that one). This also presents an interesting market challenge and opportunity, in part an extension of the cost-benefit calculation noted above: “For Viacom, this is a delicate game—for if YouTube does block all of Viacom’s shows while leaving up material from NBC, ABC, and other competitors, Viacom could easily lose by winning.”

Later in the piece, Wu shares that he was recently speaking at a Max-Planck conference in Germany, when the “Thomas Jefferson figure in the information revolution”, Larry Lessig, puts forth the following inquiry:

“So here’s what I want to know,” he asked. “Why should we tolerate tolerated use?” His point: If you care about free expression and the core reasons for our copyright law—i.e., protecting the artists—why would you put up with a system that makes something like fan art illegal and then tries to ignore the problem? Surely the right answer is to fight for reform of the copyright law: Have the law declare clearly that most noncommercial activities, like fan sites and remixes, are simply beyond the reach of the law.

Not an unsurprising angle from Lessig - why should we have this form of regulation if we aren’t required to follow it? Is the law consistent with the online values or norms that have been developed? How are online users supposed to navigate safely if there is no clear line as to what constitutes allowable behavior, or what doesn’t? The situation creates a certain unknowable jeopardy that spans a range of copyright realms - art, music, video productions, etc., which all may have different ‘owners’ who each may call on the government to enforce, or undertake independent civil efforts, to take down the infringement, or who otherwise may applaud the infringement as good for their bottom line.

Wu’s response?

It all boils down to this: Harry Potter fanboys don’t have K Street representation. Consequently, the political system spits out one kind of answer—an answer friendly to the “property interests” of powerful media companies but one that all but ignores the interests of the basement-dwellers. The formal result of that is what we have today: a copyright law that covers almost everything we do in the digital world.

As individuals, we are far less able to leverage the government, which writes the rules and chooses (or is pressured) to enforce them, than the large corporations that own many/most of the copyrights at issue, and can make the cost-benefit decisions, on a case-by-case basis, of how to respond to infringement. Without a doubt, there is more to it, but this is a useful angle. Yet, it is indeed handy for a copyright owner for this ambiguity to exist in copyright enforcement - if the infringment suits me, fine, if not, let the hounds loose!

Posted by Eric at 12:13 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

Joining the wiki bandwagon, the Director of National Intelligence recently established Intellipedia. The DNI was created in the wake of 9/11 to help break down barriers and increase information sharing across the disparate intelligence agencies.

Here is what the real Wikipedia has this to say about it:

Intellipedia was created to share information on some of the most difficult subjects facing U.S. intelligence and bring cutting-edge technology into its ever-more-youthful workforce. It also allows information to be assembled and reviewed by a wide variety of sources and agencies, to address concerns that pre-war intelligence that did not include robust dissenting opinions on Iraq’s alleged weapons programs. A number of projects are underway to explore the use of the Intellipedia for the creation of traditional Intelligence Community products.

In a Senate hearing a month ago, DNI Director McConnell evidenced a growing interest in adopting digital collaboration tools from the Internet for Intelligence use:

And analysts are also increasingly using interactive, classified blogs and wikis, much as the tech-savvy, collaboration-minded user would outside the Community. Intellipedia, the IC’s version of Wikipedia, and “A-Space” a common workspace environment likened in the press to the commercial website “MySpace,” are perhaps the best-known examples. Such tools enable experts from different disciplines to pool their knowledge, form virtual teams, and quickly make complete intelligence assessments. (PDF page 11)

Intellipedia would seem to be a good approach to some of the vexing challenges for the intell community: a new workforce, new threats, and a bureaucracy of secrecy and turf battles. Major structural change has been needed, and is in part underway, and this tool may be indicative of some of the new thinking. As one conservative commentator who apltly stated, “reforms instigated by independent reviews and implemented either by executive order or by congressional legislation need to be aimed at transforming the intelligence community from failed top-down institutions based on obsolete business models of the 1950s to the nimble, bottom-up, flat, and networked organizations that thrive in the age of information technology revolution.”

Contrary to Sunstein’s concerns that the Internet can cause a loss of shared experiences and common space, Intellipedia seeks to stimulate knowledge and experience sharing, debate and communication. Rather than push people away and into isolated communities, Intellipedia is intended to pull them together.

If numbers are a metric, a The New York Times article from a few weeks ago would indicate that the project is a success: “Sixteen months after its creation, officials say, the top-secret version of Intellipedia has 29,255 articles, with an average of 114 new articles and more than 4,800 edits to articles added each workday.” According to USA Today, Intellipedia was used as the platform for developing a new National Intelligence Estimate on Nigeria.

But of course, there are a number of potential pitfalls and problems that Intellipedia can face. Getting all agencies and individuals to contribute and ‘buy in’ is important to it becoming effective at information sharing. It must be open for agencies and individuals to access and use it, but is secrets and information must be secure and confidential. Will contributing and reading it be seen as an added work burden, or will it be seen as a benefit? Perhaps it is too soon to draw any conclusions.

Posted by Eric at 09:30 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

Yesterday, the White House released the National Strategy for Homeland Security. This is a ‘capstone’ document which addresses generally many components of homeland security, including the threat environment, and strategies, prevention, protection and response measures. A number of subordinate documents speak in greater detail about these respective components. The document cites its purpose:

[T]o guide, organize, and unify our Nation’s homeland security efforts. It provides a common framework by which our entire Nation should focus its efforts on the following four goals:
• Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks;
• Protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources;
• Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur; and
• Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success.

The document lists the domains where the government, and other actors, need to be vigilant, and includes the cyber with “land, maritime, air, space”domains. It would thus seem to be viewed as a physical space for this purpose. Otherwise, the topic of cyber security is outlined in a short side column:

Cyber Security: A Special Consideration

Many of the Nation’s essential and emergency services, as well as our critical infrastructure, rely on the uninterrupted use of the Internet and the communications systems, data, monitoring, and control systems that comprise our cyber infrastructure. A cyber attack could be debilitating to our highly interdependent CI/KR [critical infrastructure and key resources] and ultimately to our economy and national security.

A variety of actors threaten the security of our cyber infrastructure. Terrorists increasingly exploit the Internet to communicate, proselytize, recruit, raise funds, and conduct training and operational planning. Hostile foreign governments have the technical and financial resources to support advanced network exploitation and launch attacks on the informational and physical elements of our cyber infrastructure. Criminal hackers threaten our Nation’s economy and the personal information of our citizens, and they also could pose a threat if wittingly or unwittingly recruited by foreign intelligence or terrorist groups. Our cyber networks also remain vulnerable to natural disasters.

In order to secure our cyber infrastructure against these man-made and natural threats, our Federal, State, and local governments, along with the private sector, are working together to prevent damage to, and the unauthorized use and exploitation of, our cyber systems. We also are enhancing our ability and procedures to respond in the event of an attack or major cyber incident. The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the NIPP’s Cross-Sector Cyber Security plan are guiding our efforts.

Albeit short, this identifies the actors threatening US cyberspace - terrorists, hostile foreign governments, criminal actors, and natural disasters. It also cites the role of governments (national, State, local) and the private sector in securing cyberspace, via prevention of damage to and unauthorized use of cyber systems, and the development of response capabilities.

In the future, the Strategy’s Roles and Responsibilities section, subordinate documents National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the relevant National Infrastructure Protection Plan sector-specific and cross-sector plans will also be assessed.

Posted by Eric at 01:50 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

Every October is Cyber Security Awareness Month, and this is the fourth year of its celebration. US government agencies dedicated to cybersecurity will be undertaking “comprehensive outreach campaign to empower all Americans and businesses to take steps to secure their part of cyberspace”, and will be seeking to “raise awareness of the growing need to protect our nation’s critical infrastructures and key resources from cyber threats and vulnerabilities.”

Beyond promoting awareness, an important question for cybersecurity policy is: who bears the responsibility (and cost) for it?

There are various players involved, many noted above - the government (international, national, local, inter-governmental), businesses, the public - as well as academia and institutions. In the latter, I would include private-public parnterships, such as the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), non-profits like National Cyber Security Alliance, and others. Each or these actors have their own capabilities and self interest, which in part determine their roles in cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity threats span a range as well, from the mundane to the highly consequential. Assessing and prioritizing these risks is a challenge, as it can affect different actors differently, and at different levels. The threat and risk therefore also affect actors interests (and investments) in cybersecurity.

There are a variety of roles and responsibilities inherent in cybersecurity. Developing security software, conducting research, responding to threats or attacks, planning for and mitigating events, education and awareness - these are all parts of the puzzle. For each of these functions, there are costs, which impact the dynamics between the actors, and the cybersecurity burdens they bear.

Because of the interconnected nature of the Internet, the range of cyber risks and security roles cybersecurity cannot simply be ‘stovepiped’ within its respective domains. The threats, and responses, can spillover across all nodes, and thus require integration. Nonetheless, as with security in the real world, it also takes individual vigilance to keep intruders out of one’s own backdoor. Herein exists a contrast between economic security and national security which could be seen as a measure of the balance between the responsibilities of government, and that of others. Further, consistent with previous literature in our class, there are some who seek and support greater governmental involvement, while other sectors are strongly opposed and dubious of that.

In developing my paper and as a continuing theme in this blog, I intend to examine the U.S. policy as it pertains to these issues of burdens and responsibilities in cybersecurity, the dynamics between the actors, instances of ‘burden shifting’ and coopting between the actors, and how this compares to the structure or institution of cybersecurity elsewhere (i.e. Europe, or a particular nation).

Posted by Eric at 09:51 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

Webster’s defines ‘stoning’ as:

1 : to hurl stones at; especially : to kill by pelting with stones

The Wikipedia definition of ‘stoning’, or lapidation, is a bit more appropriate:

refers to a form of capital punishment whereby an organized group throws stones at the convicted individual until the person dies.

However, “cyberstoning”, or “cyber-stoning” is similar in intent, but not in action, but should include the group component. Rather, the definition for cyberstoning would more closely resemble that of “pillory”:

to expose to public derision, ridicule, or abuse.

Thus, for our purposes, “cyberstoning” should be defined as the following:

cy·ber·ston·ing
[sahy-ber-stohn], verb, adverb, noun; cyberstone, cyberstones, cyberstoned

Through the use of the internet or other digital media, to expose to mass or group public derision, ridicule, harrassment, or abuse ; commonly stemming from a perceived slight, insult, or failure to adhere to social norms, to the public or the Internet.

Alas, while I found no documented, online definition for ‘cyberstoning’, since it was referenced in no less than 4 sites located in a google search, I have not prevailed my attempts to plow new lexiconic ground.

Posted by Eric at 09:09 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

Many of this week’s reading discuss the ability of the Internet - decentralized networks, and their functions - to facilitate democracy and activism. However, a common anecdote among the articles is the particular failure of a political campaign structured in large part on decentralized networks.

Johnson bases his paper on “emergence” on the functional differences between clustering and coping mechanisms. Clustering, or intelligent crowd forming as he defines it, seems to have a magnetic affect of attracting individuals for a united cause or purpose. This can be effective in developing initial constituencies, and at drawing in contributions, a necessary and effective buzz for a political campaign - the “snowflake” analogy which Johnson refers to. But effective campaigning must be dynamic to be effective - it must have leadership, as well as feedback loops from precincts, communities, etc. upwards. This would be coping mechanism, which Johnson identifies as being absent in the Dean campaign.

Bennett finds similar challenges in decentralized networks. While such organizations are capable at bringing together diverse groups in effective activist campaigns, their unifying ideology does not translate into cohesion. As the issue of focus changes, groups or individuals may become satisfied, and depart the activist network, while others may remain seeking different ends. In a larger context, a common enemy - or opposition to a certain entity or policy - may be the only common trait. In the case of the Dean campaign, there appears to have been network organization more focused on opposition - to the relection of President Bush, war, or a status quo Democratic party - rather than unity around the candidate itself.

This theme is ultimately echoed by Farrell. Dean, he notes, “was attractive because he claimed to represent the ‘Democratic wing of the Democratic Party’”. He also cites Kos and Armstrong: Dean “tapped into frustration over the lack of opposition to Bush”. Thus, the Dean supporters were firstly, to large extent, against Bush, against centrist-capitulation, and only then, for Dean. Since “the netroots conceive of themselves as a non-ideologial movement” they lack the capacity to define and achieve the ‘big ideas’.

So, there is a thread of argument that the Internet - evident in netroots and blogging, decentralized networking, or activism organizing - can be effective in clustering tenuously-united individuals and groups in oppositional campaigns. Each ‘node’ can take up its efforts in the campaign at its own pace and its own fashion, come and leave as they choose, and yet the organization can still maintain a critical mass. The organization also has little to lose - either status quo remains, or positive change occurs. But in a poltiical campaign, where timeframes are defined, the stakes greater, and there a definite ‘loser’, feedback and coping mechanisms are required. Organizing won’t suffice - management is needed. There would seem to be a limit to the ability of the decentralized network to be effective - it can unify in opposition, where there is nothing to lose, but is not sufficient to sustain the rigors of a election.

Posted by Eric at 10:19 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

During the last class, a comparison was drawn between some aspects of game theory and certain interactions in a net neutrality-like conflict. I came across an article in Slate.com, The Stag Hunt, in which a game theorist applied the theory of the same name to a British banking collapse. Whereas the prisoner’s dilemma reconciles self interest with mitigation of loss (of freedom), the stag hunt appears to involve cooperation and the trust between self interested parties. The article explains the theory:

“In the stag hunt, two hunters must each decide whether to hunt the stag together or hunt rabbits alone. Half a stag is better than a brace of rabbits, but the stag will only be brought down with a combined effort. Rabbits, on the other hand, can be hunted by an individual without any trouble. There are two rational outcomes to the stag hunt: Either both hunters hunt the stag as a team, or each hunts rabbits by himself. Each would prefer to cooperate in hunting the stag, but if the other player’s motives or actions are uncertain, the rabbit hunt is a risk-free alternative.”

The “prisoner’s dilemma” is demonstrated in Felton’s discussion of network discriminaton. Assesesing network response to congestion he finds that “[o]ne interesting aspect of this system is that it is voluntary - the system relies on endpoint computers to slow down when they see congestion, but nothing forces them to do so.” Rather than pursuing the rational self interested approach to network congestion - keep sending packets out quickly - enough computers reduce their rates sufficient to loosen the jam. Felten also notes the challenges that upsetting this balance would cause:

“If the network disciminates by sending misleading signals about congestion, and sending them preferentally to certain machines or certain applications, the incentive for those machines and applications to stick to the social contract and do ther share to control congestion will weaken.”

But what about the stag hunt and cooperation? Yoo references a certain degree of collaboration in defending a form of network disrcimination - access tiering - but this form of association is not based on trust or inconsistent with immediate self interest.

It would seem possible that a form of stag’s hunt would be possible in response to the network neutrality debate. ISPs and content providers may have an interest in cooperating in a system that brought both greater rewards (more users and revenues), and perhaps reduced risk (from, perhaps, regulation, litigation or competition). However, the only cyber-centric pattern apparent would be the acquisition or consolidation of firms, rather than direct cooperation.

The recently reported iTunes and Starbucks collaborative indicates that there is opportunity for cooperative content delivery projects. It will be interesting to see what cyber-associations arise in the midst of the net neutrality debate.

Posted by Eric at 09:21 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)