Shira Mitchell's weblog

It is becoming increasingly clear that this summer’s so-called “Twitter revolution” in Iran was not really a revolution at all. Indeed, Ahmadinejad is still in power and the government has increased efforts to crackdown on dissent and basic freedoms. And this crackdown extends to virtual freedoms as well. Earlier this week, the New York Times reported that the Revolutionary Guards created a new police unit to sweep the Internet for dissident voices.

This campaign is part of what the government is referring to as a “soft war.” Iran’s leaders appear to be taking this new campaign very seriously—underscoring just how badly shaken they were by the protests. In general, the “soft war” describes new efforts to re-Islamize Iran’s educational system, purge secular influences, and purify the media.

It’s probably premature to come to any concrete conclusion about the “Twitter Revolution’s” net effect, but thus far it appears to be negative. Watching the power of collective action manifest itself in the streets of Tehran may have been heartening and even inspirational; unfortunately, it appears that the demonstrations further stymied the very objectives the brave protestors were fighting for.

Posted by Shira Mitchell at 05:01 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

As if Palestinians needed another impediment to uniting the West Bank and Gaza, the Global Information Society Watch’s 2009 report describes a situation where “Gaza and Ramallah are simultaneously operating two separate communications ministries, each one with a different policy regarding access to online content and information.”

The Global Information Society Watch report, which is published annually, deals this time with issues surrounding access to information and freedom of acquiring knowledge, two things the report argues are essential for the sustainance of a democratic society.

The report argues that Israel is partially responsible for the problem as it prevents equipment meant for improving the Internet industry from entering the Palestinian Authority - equipment such as servers and routers. Also to blame is the fact that the separate government administrations have very different opinions of what information their constituencies should be able to access. Indeed, access to content considered harmful to Islamic values is monitored in Gaza, but not in the West Bank. Such content include sex sites, sites concerning gay rights, or sites connected to religions other than Islam.

It’s outside the scope of the report to delve into what implications this situation may have for efforts to staunch the increasing bifurcation between the territories. But if information access plays a pivotal role in shaping societal discourse and norms, then it obviously won’t help.

Posted by Shira Mitchell at 03:29 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

I love it when hackers use their arcane expertise for good. Earlier this week, a group calling themselves “anti-fascist hackers” hacked into the Web site and email account of Holocaust denier, David Irving. Not only did the hackers obtain all of Irving’s private communications and attendee lists for his U.S. speaking tour, they posted the information to the WikiLeaks Web site for all to see.

Probably just to rub it in, the hackers also sent out an e-mail from Irving’s AOL account to a list of his supporters explaining:

“We did this to expose this Nazi-sympathizer for who he is and to shut down/disrupt any possibility of Irving rearing his fascist head in public during his tour. To David Irving and all aspiring white-power, anti-immigrant, queer-bashing, racist pigs — give it up! We will fight you on the streets and on the internet until you are swept into the dustbin of history.”

Indeed, the hackers had immediate success in disrupting Irving’s tour, for among the data was the locale of where Irving was scheduled to speak the following night. Irving usually books venues under a pseudonym and informs attendees shortly before the event is scheduled to begin. And he has good reason for doing so. Soon after the data was published, someone contacted the venue— the Catholic Kolping Society of America— where the speaking engagement was scheduled to occur and informed them of was actually going to be speaking there. The organization didn’t waste any time canceling the event.

Posted by Shira Mitchell at 09:38 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

If you were planning to chat with someone in Oman via Skype, you may want to consider e-mailing them instead. According the Times of Oman, from the beginning of the year through October, the Royal Oman Police raided 121 cyber cafes and arrested 212 people for providing VoIP technology.

According to the Oman’s Telecommunications Regulatory Act, providing telecomm services is illegal in the Sultanate. What’s more, violators of the law have to shell out RO50,000 (that’s approximately US 129,858) or spend two years in jail. Ouch!

As is often the case when Governments enact laws that stifle what many consider to be basic freedoms, the Sultanate cites national security concerns as basis for the law.

Posted by Shira Mitchell at 09:34 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

In a recent blog post, Dancho Danchev writes of the changing nature of cyber-extortionists’ business models. Included in the post is a sample DDoS extortion letter that not only demands the recipient pay a monthly fee (or else endure a paralyzing DDoS attack) but also offers a couple “bonuses,” including:

1. 30% discount if you request DDoS attack on your competitors/enemies. Fair market value ddos attacks a simple site is about $ 100 per night, for you it will cost only 70 $ per day.
2. If we turn to your competitors / enemies, to make an attack on your site, then we deny them.

It appears that the recipient of such a letter would have little choice but to submit to the extortionist’s demands—unless of course their confident that their Web site is sufficiently protected from a DDoS attack. But what kinds of legal safeguards can governments enact to protect companies who are vulnerable this type of cyber crime? I appreciate any and all suggestions.

Posted by Shira Mitchell at 02:51 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

The majority of my blog posts have been about offensive cyber warfare, but I decided to switch gears to highlight the US Holocaust Memorial Museum’s podcast featuring danah boyd*, a researcher for Microsoft and a fellow at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet & Society, who is a frequent commentator on the nature of online hate speech. This podcast is part of the Museum’s bi-weekly Voices on Antisemitism podcast series—which offers a broad range of perspectives about anti-Semitism and cotemporary hate.

While Ms. boyd does not say anything particularly groundbreaking, I think she does a decent job of framing how increased visibility of hate speech—due to the Internet—can actually be advantageous. She cautions against impulses to ban hate speech as it may end up having the opposite effect and suggests that its visibility may rouse people to take action against it.

*Please note that I intentionally did not capitalize danah boyd’s first and last name. Ms. boyd prefers that her name be spelled in all lowercase characters— so although I find this preference odd, I have nonetheless obliged her request.

Posted by Shira Mitchell at 07:10 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)

Icann, the body which oversees the Internet domain name system, announced on Friday that it has voted to institute a fast-track process for internationalized domains (IDNs). In what has been described as the one of the biggest changes in the Web’s history, the decision will allow URL’s written completely in non-Latin scripts.

Upon hearing news of this decision, my first thought was “how wonderful!”— soon the Internet and it’s many useful applications, will be more accessible to millions of people around the world. Unfortunately, questions about the cybersecurity implications quickly muted my initial enthusiasm. Indeed, the decision to allow IDNs has likely excited many cybercriminals, who are anticipating increased opportunities to spoof URLs. And, as the Times article points out, “having internationalized domain names in languages like Arabic, Russian and Chinese could make it difficult to fight cyberattacks, including malicious redirects and hacking.”

But despite the security risks, I remain enthusiastic—if slightly concerned— about Icann’s decision. It seems immoral and selfish to restrict domain names to Latin characters (thereby limiting accessibility) due to the security challenges it may otherwise present. Still, for my own cyber security, I wish I knew Russian.

Posted by Shira Mitchell at 07:05 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0)